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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 25, 1997, United States District Court Judge Richard A.
Paez announced a ruling that could have serious impacts on U.S.
companies transacting business overseas.' In the case of Doe v. Unocal,
Judge Paez allowed Burmese plaintiffs to carry forward their claims
against Unocal Corp. ("Unocal") for alleged human right violations
committed in connection with Unocal's construction of a pipeline in
Burma/Myanmar.2
The plaintiffs, comprised mainly of Burmese farmers,3 sued Unocal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 of the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") which
allows alien plaintiffs to sue in United States courts for torts committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
4
Unocal had entered into alleged joint ventures with several project
members including the State Law and Order Restoration Council
1. See Gail Diane Cox, Unocal May Be Liable for Partner's Acts, NAT'L L.J.,
May 5, 1997 (discussing the impact the Unocal case may have on overseas investment);
Dominic Bencivenga, Human Rights Abuses Suits Attempt to Extend Liability to
Corporations, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 4, 1997, at 5 (noting that if corporations fail to monitor
overseas partners, they may be sued for human rights abuses); Joseph D. Pizzuro &
Nancy E. Delaney, New Peril for Companies Doing Business Overseas: Alien Tort
Claims Act Interpreted Broadly, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 24, 1997, at 55 (discussing the
expansion of alien plaintiffs' right to sue under the Alien Tort Claims Act).
2. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). See generally
Tiffany Danitz, Burmese Government-in-Exile Takes U.S. Company to Court, INSIGHT
MAGAZINE, March 17, 1997. After seizing control of Burma in 1988, the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) changed Burma's name to Myanmar.
3. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 883. The plaintiffs named are villagers from the
Tenasserim region of Burma. The plaintiffs seek injunctive, declaratory and
compensatory relief for alleged international human rights violations committed by the
defendants in furtherance of the Yadana gas pipeline project. Id. at 883-84.
4. Section 1350 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). Congress enacted the ATCA in
1789, and recently reaffirmed that the Act authorizes United States courts to hear cases
involving international law violations. The reaffirmation is seen in the legislative history
of the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1991). See H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3-4 (1991), reprinted in 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86
(1992). In this Act, Congress stated that the ATCA "should remain intact to permit suits
based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary
international law." Id. at 4. See Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication
of International Human Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute, 41 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 539, 544 (1997) (discussing the various interpretations of the language of § 1350
and noting the lack of clear intent shown from its drafters).
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("SLORC"), the military junta that seized control of Burma in 1988.'
The project, named the Yadana Natural Gas Project, involved building a
250 mile pipeline costing over one billion dollars.6 The plaintiffs alleged
that SLORC committed human rights abuses, including torture and
forced labor, in connection with building the pipeline.7  Although
SLORC was entitled to sovereign immunity,8 the federal court in
California had jurisdiction over Unocal for the abuses that SLORC
committed.9
In light of Unocal's potential liability for the abusive acts committed
by SLORC, U.S. companies operating overseas have great cause for
concern. Even though Unocal involves human rights violations in
particular, Unocal's liability pursuant to the ATCA may have broader
5. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 883. The project members include: Total S.A.
("Total"), a French oil company; the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise ("MOGE"), a
Burmese oil company wholly owned and operated by SLORC; and the Petroleum
Authority of Thailand Exploration & Production Public Co. Ltd. ("PTEP"). National
Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) v. Unocal Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 336
(C.D. Cal. 1997). The NCGUB case involves another action brought against Unocal for
the same tortious acts committed by SLORC in connection with building the pipeline.
6. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 883; Cox, supra note 1, at 1. The oil companies
(Unocal, Total and MOGE) commenced negotiations for the construction of the pipeline
in 1991. See Pizzuro & Delaney, supra note 1, at S5. Unocal has invested $20 million
in the project as of November 1995. See Cox, supra note 1, at 2. The project plans
indicate that the pipeline will run through Burma into Thailand and will cost
approximately $1.2 billion. See Bencivenga, supra note 1, at 5.
7. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 ( C.D. Cal. 1997). Plaintiffs
contend that SLORC used violence and intimidation to relocate and enslave farmers in
order to build the pipeline. See id.; NCGUB, 176 F.R.D. at 336. Allegedly, the
government police committed acts of torture, violence, rape and forced labor to further
the building of the pipeline. See Pizzuro & Delaney, supra note 1, at S5.
8. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 885-88 (noting that SLORC and MOGE are
entitled to soveriegn immunity pursuant to The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA")). Generally, the FSIA limits a plaintiff's ability to sue a sovereign, but an
exception applies when the sovereign has engaged in a commercial activity. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 (1994). Judge Paez rejected Unocal's argument that the Unocal
case fell under this commercial activity exception. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 887-89.
9. In response to Unocal's motion to dismiss, Judge Paez held, among other
things, that: the Burmese government was not a necessary and indispensable party; the
court had jurisdiction over claims against Unocal under the ATCA; allegations of torture
and slavery by the Burmese government in connection with the pipeline project stated a
claim against Unocal; and consideration of these claims were not precluded by the act of
state doctrine. A separate case brought by the NCGUB confirmed that the act of state
doctrine did not bar consideration of claims of torture and forced labor. NCGUB, 176
F.R.D. 329, 354 (C.D. Cal. 1997). In this November 5, 1997 ruling, Judge Paez
dismissed one plaintiff party, the NCGUB, because it lacked standing to bring the action
in a United States Court. See id. at 360.
1125
implications. Corporations may in the future be held accountable for all
types of tortious conduct committed by business partners, including
potential liability due to unfair labor practices and even simple
negligence. This potential liability is problematic considering that,
although certain tortious conduct may be illegal by U.S. standards, those
same acts may be legal in the country in which they are performed. The
issue then arises of whether U.S. courts should hear such cases,
necessarily imposing U.S. legal standards on conduct occurring in
foreign territory.
Critics have argued that the problem of foreign sovereigns committing
abusive acts in their own countries is a matter of foreign affairs that is
best left to Congress and the President. They contend that U.S. courts
have no authority to hear such matters. This Comment examines
whether US. companies conducting business overseas with foreign
partners should be held accountable in U.S. courts for human rights
abuses and other tortious acts committed by those partners.
Prior to Unocal, several organizations took measures to mitigate the
gross human rights violations occurring in countries where U.S.-based
corporations were operating.' ° Recently, more specific measures have
been taken to counter human rights abuses in Burma." Unfortunately,
these attempts have been unsuccessful, and companies like Unocal are
left with no clear guidelines for investing overseas.'2
In the absence of effective mandates from the United States
government or from any world organization, this Comment proposes
that transnational corporations ("TNCs") 3 should develop their own
private codes of conduct to ensure the protection of human rights abroad.
Specifically, it will address the legal and moral importance of TNCs
withholding investment from, or divesting from, projects that are
connected with human rights abuses. Furthermore, when TNCs fail to
uphold human rights in connection with their business dealings, the
United States court system might be an appropriate means for affording
10. The groups include the United Nations, the United States Congress, the United
States President, local governments and private groups. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.
12. Currently, corporate and governmental policies provide limited guidance on
how corporations operating overseas should respond to human rights violations. The
existing policies are too vague to serve as a guide for the proper corporate response to
specific human rights violations. See Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International Human
Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 154 (1997).
13. The term 'transnational corporation' refers to a corporation with affiliated
business establishments in more than one country. See Jonathan I. Charney,
Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International Law, 1983 DuKE L.J.
748, 749 n.1 (1983) (citing WENER FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD
POLITICS, A STUDY OF BUsiNEss, LABOR, AND POLITICAL GROUPS 22-23 (1972)).
1126
[VoL. 35: 1123, 1998] Transnational Corporations
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEV
plaintiffs a remedy.
This Comment addresses these broad issues in three parts. First, it
discusses past initiatives by various governing bodies and private groups
to handle the problem of TNCs investing in countries that commit grave
human rights violations. 14 More specifically, the efforts discussed are
those of the United Nations, the U.S. Congress and the President, state
and city governments, and private groups. 5 Because of the U.S.
government's desire to promote free trade, none of these efforts has
proved effective in regulating investment activity overseas.
This Comment then discusses whether, in the absence of clear
mandates from the United States government, TNCs should be held
accountable for human rights abuses committed by foreign partners. 6
Specifically, three issues will be addressed. First, is this a matter of
foreign affairs that should be left to the United States executive and
legislative branches instead of the judiciary?17  Second, does TNC
activity that furthers human rights abuses violate international customary
law? 8 Third, do TNCs have a moral duty to uphold human rights
overseas? 9 Because the answer to each of these questions requires an
examination of the particular facts of a given case, this Comment will
discuss the opposing arguments in the context of the Unocal case.
Finally, this Comment proposes the solution that TNCs should
develop and follow private codes of conduct until the legislature
intervenes.20 Increasingly, TNCs are developing these codes, but no real
mechanism exists to enforce the codes.2' Absent any legislative directive
and when codes of conduct fail, allowing plaintiffs to sue TNCs in U.S.
courts may deter TNCs from engaging in overseas activities that
contribute to human rights violations.'
14. See infra Part 11.
15. See infra Part 11
16. See infra Part ll.
17. See infra Part IHI(A).
18. See infra Part Im(B).
19. See infra Part 11(C).
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part IV(B).
22. This Comment discusses possible regulation of U.S.-based TNCs only, as
opposed to regulation of TNCs that are not based in the U.S.
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II. EFFORTS To REGULATE TNC Ac'rlvrrY
A. The United Nations
In 1974, the forty-eight member states of the United Nations
Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC") formed the United Nations
Commission on TNCs. 3 Their main purpose was to formulate a code of
conduct for TNCs." In 1990, the Commission completed the final draft
of the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations
("the Code") which attempted to balance the competing interests of
regulating corporate conduct and setting forth fundamental standards for
nondiscriminatory government host behavior towards TNCs.2' The final
draft of the Code explicitly stated that TNCs must respect human rights,
requiring that human rights take precedence over cultural norms. 6
Western governments and TNCs opposed the adoption of the Code on
the grounds that it would impose significant duties on TNCs, without
imposing equally significant duties on host governments.27
Consequently, negotiations concerning adoption of the Code ceased in
1992. Therefore the Code serves merely as a moral standard until it is
formally adopted.2
Even though the United Nations has not yet adopted a formal standard
for regulating TNC activity overseas, it has made clear efforts to combat
23. See Frey, supra note 12, at 166.
24. See id. The code was inspired by allegations of improper TNC behavior
overseas. See Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 94th Cong., 381-86 (1975).
25. Development and International Economic Corporation: Transnational
Corporations, U.N. Economic and Social Commission, 2d Sess., Agenda Item 7(d), U.N.
Doc. E/1990/94 (1990). The Code requires that "[t]ransnational corporations shall
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in countries in which they operate. In
their social and industrial relations, transnational corporations shall not discriminate on
the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, language, social, national and ethnic origin or
political or other opinion." Id. at 7. See also Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-
Darricarrere, Enforcing Izternational Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of
Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TmANSNAT'L L. 663, 670 (1995).
26. See Frey, supra note 12, at 167.
27. See id.
28. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 25, at 670. In 1994, the
Commission on TNCs was moved from ECOSOC, and became a commission under the
Trade and Development Board. See Frey, supra note 12, at 167. This move was a result
of the Secretary-General's decision to consolidate all activities related to TNCs within
the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"). See id. UNCTAD
promotes foreign direct investment, especially investment in developing countries. The
Commission's name change to the "Commission on International Investment and
Transnational Corporations" showed a slight commitment on the part of the United
Nations to focus regulatory efforts on corporations conducting business overseas. See id.
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the human rights abuses committed by SLORC in Burma. The U.N.
Committee on the Rights of the Child and the International Labor
Organization have attempted to persuade SLORC to cease all use of
child labor and forced labor in Burma.29  Additionally, the United
Nations Human Rights Commission unanimously condemned SLORC in
1997.30
B. The United States Legislature
The U.S. legislature's primary method of restricting trade and
investment in certain countries is by imposing economic sanctions." In
early years of governing TNCs, the legislature was only slightly
concerned with human rights abuses.32 More recently, several proposals
have been set forth in Congress, but none have been implemented.
The most thorough attempt to regulate TNCs was the 1986 Anti-
Apartheid Act in South Africa, which contained a code of conduct for
human rights protection.3 Any United States national employing over
29. See Harvetta Asamoah, et al., International Human Rights, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN REVIEW: 1998,
Summer 1998, at 559, 562.
30. See id. The United Nations has taken other measures to address international
concerns. On June 15, 1998, United Nations delegates from more than 120 countries
agreed to establish a permanent international criminal court, in spite of much skepticism
concerning whether these individuals would be able to reach a consensus. The court will
try individuals suspected of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. See The
U.N. and War Criminals: How Strong a Court?, THE EcONOMIST, June 13, 1998, at 46.
31. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-500.901 (1997) (concerning sanctions against
North Korea); Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172 § 5, 110 Stat.
1541, 1543-45 (concerning sanctions against Iran and Libya); and Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 102, 110 Stat.
785, 792-94 (concerning sanctions against Cuba).
32. Although the U.S. government is often willing to regulate business activities in
foreign countries, the government has had little success in regulating TNCs on human
rights issues. See Frey, supra note 12, at 169. One of the earliest initiatives against
human rights abuses was the Hawley-Taft Act that Congress passed in 1930 which
prohibited importation of products made by convict labor. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L.
No. 71-361 § 307, 46 Stat. 590, 689-90 (1930).
33. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (1998),
repealed by South African Democratic Transition Support Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 139-
149, § 4(a)(1)-(3), 107 Stat. 1504 (Supp. 1995) (outlining a code of conduct for U.S.
companies largely based on the Sullivan Principles adopted in South Africa); see
generally Eric Taylor, Comment, The History of Foreign Investment and Labor Law in
South Africa and the Impact on Investment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, 9
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 611 (1996).
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twenty-five people in South Africa was required to follow this code?'
Also, in 1989, Senators John Heinz and Dennis DeConcini introduced a
bill which attempted to formulate codes of conduct for business
transactions with the Soviet Union.35 It required U.S.-based TNCs to
promote human rights and democratic reform.36
In 1991, Congressman John Miller introduced a similar bill which
created a code of conduct for U.S. companies conducting business in
China and was to be adopted on a voluntary basis only.37 Like previous
bills presented before Congress, this bill was not enacted into law.
However, it was one of the first Congressional initiatives which
provided for a human rights code to be adhered to by TNCs
Several other Congressmen planned to sponsor new bills similar to the
Miller legislation but refrained once President Clinton vowed to propose
his own code of conduct for companies transacting business overseas.
President Clinton proposed the Model Business Principles to address
human rights conditions in China. 9 Critics argue that the principles
were virtually ineffective because they were voluntary only.' However,
the Model Business Principles at least serve as an example of a broad
human rights policy that TNCs can choose to adopt privately.4'
With respect to Burma in particular, Senator Mitch McConnell
proposed a 1995 bill which would ban U.S. investment and trade with
Burma through The Burma Freedom and Democracy Act, which was
modeled after the Anti-Apartheid Act. 2 The Burma Act sought to
prohibit any investment supporting SLORC, even investment in which
TNCs unknowingly supported SLORC.43 The bill mandated that the
U.S. government: (1) withhold support for loans to Burma from
international financial institutions; (2) prevent direct assistance to
SLORC; and (3) exclude members of SLORC from the United States."
The Clinton Administration did not adopt this bill because of its desire
to promote free trade and investment in Burma. In an April 5, 1995
letter to AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, U.S. Secretary of State
34. See Frey, supra note 12, at 188 n.86.
35. Slepak Principles Act, H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
36. See id.
37. H.R. 3489, 102d Cong. § 401-05 (1991).
38. See id. at § 401(b).
39. See Frey, supra note 12, at 171. President Clinton's code of conduct promise
stemmed from his decision to uphold China's most favored nation status. See id.
40. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
41. See infra Part IV.A (discussing formal adoption of codes of conduct by TNCs).
42. See Frey, supra note 12, at 169. Senator McConnell had previously been an
advocate of legislative sanctions against South Africa in 1986. See Danitz, supra note 2,
at 4.
43. See Frey, supra note 12, at 169.
44. See id.
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Warren Christopher acknowledged concern for the human rights
situation in Burma, but refused to support the full trade and investment
embargo proposed by Kirkland (and captured in the McConnell bill)
According to the Secretary of State,
To be effective such an embargo would need international backing.. .We have
found no interest in an U.N. embargo. Indeed, many of Burma's largest trading
and investment partners argue for more trade and investment and profess to
believe that more interaction with the world economy and with states whgre
political diversity is respected will encourage change for the better in Burma.
Warren Christopher's letter highlights one of the major dilemmas
concerning U.S. investment overseas: whether such investment actually
promotes democracy in corrupt countries or whether it encourages
corruption by providing foreign governments with financial assistance.46
Because of this dilemma, the U.S. government has been reluctant to
adopt a policy that would prohibit investment in Burma.
Recently, United States Senator Jesse Helms has attempted to address
human rights problems in Burma by suggesting that the U.S. impose
unilateral sanctions on Burma.47  Senators Dianne Feinstein and John
McCain have made other, less drastic attempts; they have advocated
allowing the President, in conjunction with other nations, to develop a
multilateral strategy against Burma before imposing sanctions.4' The
President has not expressly adopted either of these proposals.49
C. The United States Executive
The President and the Executive branch have the power "to enforce
U.S. policy through economic sanctions such as the revocation of most
favored nation status, the suspension of economic and security
assistance, and the vetoing of assistance from international financial
institutions."50 President Clinton has been reluctant to use his authority
to limit foreign commercial activities of U.S. companies, as
demonstrated by his resistance to forming a strong policy against human
45. Id. at 170 (quoting letter from Warren Christopher, former U.S. Secretary of
State, to Lane Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO (Apr. 5, 1995) (ellipsis in original)).
46. See infra Part lI.C.2.
47. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 894 n.17 (C.D. Cal. 1997). In
support of his position, Senator Helms stated that "[w]e know there is forced labor in
Burma." Id. (citations omitted).
48. See id.
49. See infra Part II.C.
50. Frey, supra note 12, at 171.
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rights abuses in China." In response to the criticism he received for
upholding China's Most Favored Nation ("MFN") status, President
Clinton set forth the Model Business Principles. 2 The Principles were
established not just for China, but for all nations, and they are voluntary,
with no provisions for government monitoring or enforcement."
Although the Clinton Code has been highly criticized,"' some companies
have in fact adopted the rules as minimum guidelines for transacting
business abroad.
5
With respect to Burma specifically, President Clinton refused to
impose economic sanctions against SLORC despite strong pressures
from legislators and activists.56 Congress has recently granted the
President conditional authority to prohibit only "new investment" in
Burma.57 Thus Congress and the President have only made cautious
51. See id. at 171-72. See Daniel C. Turack, The Clinton Administration's
Response to China's Human Rights Record: At the Half-Way Point, 3 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 1, 49-50 (1995) (criticizing President Clinton's attempt to promote human rights
in China through economic development); see also Edward A. Gargan, Business Objects
to a Code in China, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1994, at D2; David E. Sanger, Clinton to Urge
a Rights Code For Businesses Dealing Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at Dl.
52. See Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights
Revolution? 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1963, 1974 (1996). In order for China's MFN
status to be renewed, China was required to show significant progress in adhering to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Turack, supra note 51, at 7-8; see also
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948). President Clinton admitted in a May 26, 1994 news conference that China did
not make "overall significant progress" with respect to human rights, but he chose to
renew China's MFN trading status anyway. He chose to "delink" human rights from the
process, and considered a stringent human rights policy as no longer necessary. Turack,
supra note 51, at 48. President Clinton has been highly criticized for this decision
because "widespread and well-documented" human rights abuses have continued in
China. Id. at 49-50.
53. See Cassel, supra note 52, at 1974.
54. See, e.g., Clay Chandler, 'Code of Conduct' Draft Assailed: Rights Groups
Criticize Administration's Rules for U.S. Firms Abroad, WASH. POsT, Mar. 28, 1995, at
D4; Steven Mufson, The Beijing Duck: What U.S. Firms in China Don't Do for Human
Rights, WASH. POsT, Apr. 9, 1995, at Cl; see also Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy A.
Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors
in China, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 66, 69 (1993) (stating that business involvement in
promoting human rights in China is not an adequate substitute for effective governmental
actions against China).
55. See Frey, supra note 12, at 173.
56. See supra Part II.B; see also Ken Silverstein, Beyond Rangoon: Local
Lobbyists and Unocal Shill for Burma's Military Junta, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 22, 1997,
at 38. The strong lobbying efforts by groups funded by Unocal may have affected the
President's decision not to impose sanctions on Burma. See id. Unocal has hired New
York's premiere lobbying firm, Davidoff & Malito, to help deter legislative efforts that
would hinder investment in Burma. See id. As of April 1997, Unocal is the largest
investor in Burma. See id. Amnesty International's report that 1996 was the worst year
for human rights in Burma since 1988, when the military seized and slaughtered 3000
people, evidences the atrocious acts occurring in Burma. See id.
57. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 894 n.17 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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attempts to limit human fights abuses in Burma. Again, such caution
seems to stem from their reluctance to hinder free trade.
D. Private Groups
In past years several private groups have set forth initiatives to
mitigate human fights abuses in countries where such abuses
consistently occur. 8  Two of the most noteworthy, the Sullivan
Principles and the MacBride Principles, have strongly impacted TNCs
by forcing them to realize their influential roles with respect to human
rights abroad."
1. The Sullivan Principles Concerning South Africa
The Sullivan Principles, which were written by a General Motors
board member, required TNCs to uphold non-discrimination in the
workplace and to participate in community investment in South Africa.6
The purpose of community investment was to increase employment
opportunities for oppressed racial groups.6 By 1986, two hundred of the
two hundred sixty corporations doing business in South Africa had
adopted the Sullivan Principles.62
The desegregation efforts were actually regulated by an individual, D.
Reid Weedon, a senior vice president of Massachusetts-based consulting
firm Arthur D. Little.63 These efforts resulted in desegregation of
58. See Frey, supra note 12, at 174. Private initiatives against human rights abuses
include: the Sullivan Principles (regulating TNC activity in South Africa), the MacBride
Principles (regulating TNC activity in Ireland), the Slepak Principles (creating codes of
conduct for TNCs in Russia), the Miller Code (suggesting conduct for TNCs in China),
the Maquiladora Code (issuing a code of conduct for U.S. companies with operations
along the border of Mexico), and the "Rugmark" campaign (creating a foundation which
monitors companies against using child labor). See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere,
supra note 25, at 671-73.
59. See Cassel, supra note 52, at 1971.
60. See id. at 1970-71; see also Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback,
Environmental Activism and the Ethical Investor, 22 J. CORP. L. 465 (1997).
61. See Frey, supra note 12, at 175.
62. See Cassel, supra note 52, at 1970. See generally DAvIm HAUCK ET AL., Two
DECADES OF DEBATE: THE CONTROVERSY OVER U.S. COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA app.
B, at 159 (1983); DEsAIX MYERS III ET AL., U.S. BusINEsS IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE
ECONOMIC, POLICAL AND MORAL ISSUEs 97 (1980).
63. See Stratford P. Sherman, Scoring Corporate Conduct in South Africa,
FORTUNE, July 9, 1984, at 168, 168. Companies were required to turn over performance
information to the consulting firm, and the firm would compile and release a public
report comparing the performance of companies who had agreed to adhere to the
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hundreds of enterprises, improvements in education and job training for
workers, and increased investment in the infrastructure of black and
desegregated education in South Africa." However, some commentators
argue that the Sullivan Principles ultimately were a failure, and that
apartheid fell because of other factors such as corporate divestment from
South Africa, as well as government sanctions against South Africa.65
2. The MacBride Principles Concerning Northern Ireland
The MacBride Principles, modeled after the Sullivan Principles, were
intended to secure equal treatment for Catholic workers in Protestant-
majority Northern Ireland.66 The principles set forth a series of non-
discrimination standards, which promoted hiring and training on a
principles. See Geltman & Skroback, supra note 60, at 471.
64. See Geltman & Skroback, supra note 60, at 472. The Sullivan Principles
helped black South Africans gain rights in the workplace, while raising awareness of the
injustices in the South African labor system. The principles also helped educate
investors, by allowing them to make investment decisions according to moral
determinations. See id. at 471. Several corporations adopted the Principles because of
social and moral pressures such as: (1) increased media reporting; (2) rising public
interest concerning the role of business in South Africa; (3) the need to improve
corporate image with domestic groups; (4) the growing number of shareholder
resolutions calling for adoption of the Sullivan Principles; and (5) the growing use of the
Sullivan Principles by investors in making moral determinations regarding their
investments. See id. at 472. Economic pressure seemed to have had the most significant
impact on U.S. corporations. See id. at 472 n.49. See also Richard T. DeGeorge,
"Sullivan-Type" Principles for U.S. Multinationals in Emerging Economies, 18 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 1193, 1201 (1997) (discussing the corruption and bribery that confront
TNCs when investing overseas, and proposing that TNCs adopt codes similar to the
Sullivan Principles).
65. See Cassel, supra note 52, at 1971.
66. See id.; Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 25, at 671-72. The
MacBride Principles set forth initiatives for: (1) increasing the representation of
individuals from under-represented religious groups in the work force, including
managerial, supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs; (2) providing
adequate security for the protection of minority employees both at the work place and
while traveling to and from work; (3) banning provocative religious or political emblems
from the work place; (4) publicly advertising all job openings, and making special
recruitment efforts to attract applicants from under-represented religious groups; (5)
refraining from favoring particular religious groups in layoff, recall and termination
procedures; (6) abolishing job reservations, apprenticeship restrictions and differential
employment criteria which discriminate on the basis of religion or ethnic origin; (7)
developing training programs that prepare current minority employees for skilled jobs,
including the expansion of existing programs and the creation of new programs to train,
upgrade and improve the skills of minority employees; (8) establishing procedures to
assess, identify and actively recruit minority employees with potential for further
advancement; (9) appointing a senior management staff to oversee the company's
affirmative action efforts; and (10) setting up time tables to carry out affirmative action
principles. See Kevin A. Burke, Fair Employment in Northern Ireland: The Role of
Affirmative Action, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 10 n.42 (1994). Sean MacBride
amplified these principles in 1986. See id.
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nonsectarian basis. They also mandated adequate employee security and
protection from sectarian violence.67 Currently, most corporations do not
follow the MacBride Principles, mainly due to lack of public pressurei
61
Unlike the strong public rallying against apartheid in South Africa,
public support of human rights reform in Northern Ireland has not
seemed to influence TNC behavior.69 Nevertheless, several states have
adopted the MacBride principles to govern TNC investment.0
E. Local Governments
Several cities and one state, Massachusetts, have enacted laws to
address the human rights situation in Burma. In 1996, Massachusetts
amended its general laws, prohibiting the state or state agencies from
transacting business with entities on a "restricted purchase list."' The
list contains the names of all persons and entities currently involved in
67. See Burke, supra note 66, at 10 n.42; Dermot O'Callaghan, From Belfast to
Brixton: Could New Monitoring Measures Cross the Irish Sea? PERSONNEL MGMT.,
Aug. 1988, at 44, 45.
68. Although some shareholders have requested that corporations follow the
MacBride Principles, only approximately 24 U.S. firms conducting business in Ireland
have agreed to make efforts toward implementing the standards. See Burke supra note
66, at 11-12. These firms include: Alexander and Alexander, AM International,
American Home Products, Avery Dennison, AT&T, Data General, Digital Equipment
Co., Dupont, Federal Express, Fruit of the Loom, GATX Inc., Honeywell, Hyster
(NACCO Industries), IBM, NYNEX, Oneida, Pitney Bowes, Proctor and Gamble, Sara
Lee, Sonoco, Teleflex, Texaco, Unysis and VF Inc. See id. at 12 n.47. Although
corporations are reluctant to adopt the principles, several states have in fact adopted
them. See id. at 12. The states are: Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampsire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island. See id. at 12 n.49. States seem more inclined than corporations to adopt the
principles, perhaps due to the strong public pressure to pass such legislation. See also
infra Part .E (discussing whether state and local government enactments that prohibit
or control investment overseas are constitutional).
69. See Frey, supra note 12, at 176. The British government has opposed the
adoption of the principles because it does not want TNCs to divest from Ireland. See
Burke, supra note 66, at 13. However, several U.S. politicians support the adoption of
the principles, including New York State Governor Mario Cuomo, New York City
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, and President Bill Clinton. See id. at 13 n.51.
70. See supra note 68 for a list of states that have adopted the principles.
71. MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 7, § 22J (West 1996 & Supp. 1998). See David
Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in
the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 180 (1997). Other states that are considering similar measures are
Connecticut, Texas, North Carolina, Vermont and California. See Asamoah, supra note
29, at 562.
1135
business dealings with Burma.72 In response to this legislation, several
companies, including Apple Computers, Eastman Kodak and Hewlett-
Packard, divested holdings in Burma.73
The City of Berkeley, California, passed a resolution in February 1995
prohibiting contracts with entities conducting business in Burma. The
prohibition is to remain effective "until the City Council determines that
the people of Burma have become self-governing."'74
The City of San Francisco passed a similar measure, prohibiting the
city from entering into contracts with businesses operating in Burma.
The city disqualified Ericsson GE ("Ericsson") from entering into a $40
million contract to rebuild the city's emergency radio system.75 The city
disqualified Ericsson because of the business ties that Ericsson's parent
company maintained with Burma.76 Other local governments that have
passed similar measures include: Madison, Wisconsin; Santa Monica,
California; Oakland, California; Carborro, North Carolina; Takoma
Park, Maryland; and Ann Arbor, Michigan.7
Even though these efforts show an active part of local governments to
rectify the situation in Burma, much debate has occurred over whether
local governments have the authority to pass these laws and whether
these laws are constitutional. Some critics argue that allowing state
and local governments to affect international dealings through economic
sanctions threatens the authority of the federal government and its ability
to effectively conduct foreign affairs.79 The European Union and Japan
have complained about the Massachusetts law specifically, claiming it
violates the U.S. Constitution and an international government
72. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 71, at 180. The list is included in the
publication entitled "Multinational Businesses in Burma," published by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center in Washington D.C. See Asamoah, supra note 29, at 562.
73. See Danitz, supra note 2, at 45.
74. Berkeley, Cal., Resolution No. 57,881-N.S., §§ IIIB, IVB (Feb. 28, 1995). See
also Tiffany Danitz, Senate May Follow State, City Actions to Punish Burma, WASH.
TIMEs, May 4, 1995, at A20; Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 71, at 180.
75. See Asamoah, supra note 29, at 562.
76. See id. The City of San Francisco also rejected a $123 million contract with
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries for the building of an airport transportation system. See Ted
Bardacke, American Burma Boycotts Start to Bite, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1997, at 6.
77. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 71, at 180 n.14.
78. See, e.g., Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 71. Serious questions exist as to
the constitutionality of imposing state or local government laws to regulate international
behavior through trade restrictions. See Howard N. Fenton IH, The Fallacy of
Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 563, 565 (1993). State and local restrictions may seriously
disrupt U.S. foreign policy and international trade. See id. at 566. See also Steven R.
Salbu, True Codes Versus Voluntary Codes of Ethics in International Markets: Towards
the Preservation of Colloquy in Emerging Global Communities, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus.
L. 327 (1994).
79. See Fenton, supra note 78, at 563.
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procurement agreement.0
Also, several private organizations have initiated actions to challenge
the constitutionality of state and local selective purchasing laws Some
of these groups believe that selective purchasing laws violate "the
foreign commerce clause, the preemption clause, the supremacy clause,
and the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution."'  However, these selective purchasing laws have
become increasingly popular, and their constitutional validity may
remain unchallenged.'
Ill. TNC ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ACTS OF FOREIGN PARTNERS
A. Matter of Foreign Affairs
Judges and scholars have acknowledged that human rights abuses
committed solely by foreign partners in connection with TNC
investment overseas may constitute a matter of foreign affairs to be
handled by Congress and the President, and not by the judiciary.
4
Because Unocal directly addresses the acts of SLORC (and the United
States currently considers SLORC to be the government of
Burma/Myanmar)," the case may infringe upon the foreign policy efforts
80. See Danitz, supra note 2, at 4-5. The European Union and Japan have asserted
that these measures are "inconstent with obligations under the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement that state and local governments will
remove public procurement market barriers." Asamoah, supra note 29, at 562. While
the European Union and the United States have intitated dispute settlement consultations
concerning this issue, the European Union may choose to initate arbitration procedures if
these consultations do not resolve the issue. See id.
81. See Asamoah, supra note 29, at 562.
82. Id. at 562-63. See also, Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 70.
83. See Fenton, supra note 78, at 565.
84. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 894 n.17 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(regarding Unocal's contention that adjudication of this case will interfere with
Congressional and Executive efforts to exert pressure on SLORC to reform its human
rights record). See also Walker, supra note 4, at 560 (discussing whether a suit for
human rights abuses committed overseas raises legitimate foreign policy concerns that
would warrant a stay of proceedings or even dismissal of an entire action in United
States courts).
85. National Coalition Gov't of Burma (NCGUB) v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329,
352 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The court took judicial notice of the fact that the United States
considers SLORC to be the current government of Burma when conducting foreign
affairs. It also noted that "SLORC is properly deemed a foreign sovereign for purposes
of the act of state doctrine." See id. Unocal presented evidence to encourage the court to
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of the United States government.
Indeed, Unocal argued that under the act of state doctrine, the court
was interfering with the foreign policy efforts of Congress and the
President by adjudicating plaintiffs' claims.86 The act of state doctrine
requires sovereign states to respect the independence of other sovereign
states; United States courts will not hear cases concerning the potentially
illegal acts of a foreign sovereign committed within the sovereign's own
territory. The requirements of the act of state doctrine seem to be
satisfied in Unocal: the acts were sovereign in nature, committed by the
Burmese government, and were against its own citizens and within its
own territory.
However, the Unocal court admitted that the scope of the application
of the act of state doctrine is unclear, and it rejected Unocal's argument
mainly because the policy behind the act of state doctrine did not justify
its application in this case. The court stated that the doctrine should not
apply unless there exists a likelihood that "adjudication of the matter
will bring the nation into hostile confrontation with a foreign state."'
The court reasoned that because SLORC already knew of the United
States government's condemnation of its abusive practices with respect
to human rights, no threat of "confrontation" existed in this case.
In addition to the act of state doctrine, courts have invoked the
political question doctrine to dismiss cases that interfere with the foreign
policy efforts of certain governments. 9 Under the political question
doctrine, courts should defer to the executive branch when foreign
policy is involved." In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, a case
consisting of a fragmented group of differing opinions, one judge
judicially notice this fact, including sections from: the Department of State, Burma
Country Commercial Guide for 1995; the CIA World Fact Book for 1995; and Madeline
Albright's testimony before the United States Senate in 1996 (when Albright was serving
as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations). Albright stated that SLORC "is
unfortunately the recognized government of Burma." Id. at 351-52.
86. The rationale behind the act of state doctrine involves a separation of powers
concept, whereby sovereigns will not question the actions of other sovereigns. This
doctrine also avoids potential judicial interference with the Executive and Congress in
foreign affairs matters, especially matters that are potentially embarrassing for those
branches of government. See Pizzuro & Delaney, supra note 1, at S5. See also Underhill
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1897) (providing classic policy issues surrounding
the act of state doctrine).
87. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 893.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 892-93 (discussing the two doctrines that reflect the judiciary's
concerns regarding separation of powers: the political question doctrine and the act of
state doctrine).
90. Jean-Marie Simon, The Alien Torts Claims Act: Justice or Show Trials?, 11
B.U. IrNr'LL.J. 1, 74 (1993).
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implemented the political question doctrine.91 Judge Robb reasoned that
the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the Palestinian Liberation
Organization was proper because the court was not in a position to
handle claims involving foreign affairs.' If courts heard such claims,
they would jeopardize the flexibility of the executive branch to deal with
international issues diplomatically.9
Judge Paez, the presiding judge of the Unocal case, was able to avoid
applying both the political question and the act of state doctrines. He
addressed the issue of whether the Unocal case caused the judiciary to
overstep its authority by inviting the Department of State "to express its
views concerning the ramifications of this litigation on the foreign
policy of the United States."'  In response, Michael J. Matheson, the
Acting Legal Advisor of the U.S. Department of State, wrote that "at this
time adjudication of the claims based on allegations of torture and
slavery would not prejudice or impede the conduct of U.S. foreign
relations with the current government of Burma."95 Judge Paez used this
letter as a basis for rejecting Unocal's argument that the court was
interfering with the foreign policy efforts of Congress and the President.
Although this letter constitutes merely one opinion from the U.S.
government, it shows that the act of state doctrine does not automatically
bar claims that involve foreign governments. Judges can use their
discretion in applying the doctrine, and outcomes may depend on which
foreign government is involved. In Unocal, because the U.S. had
already expressed its condemnation of SLORC's abusive practices,
adjudication of the matter does not interfere with U.S. foreign policy.
However, if the governments of Britain or France, for example, were
engaging in activity the United States abhors, the outcome would be less
clear. Most likely, U.S. courts would refuse to hear those cases, and
would claim that such matters should be handled by the other branches
of the U.S. government. The act of state doctrine does not provide
predictability in this area; courts may or may not apply the doctrine,
91. 726 F.2d 774, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J. concurring).
92. See id. at 825-26.
93. See id. at 823-27.
94. National Coalition Gov't of Burma (NCGUB) v. Unocal, 176 F.R.D. 329, 335
(C.D. Cal. 1997). The letter from the Honorable Richard A. Paez to Michael J.
Matheson Dated April 24, 1997 and the letter from Michael I. Matheson to Frank W.
Hunger, Assistant Attorney General dated July 8, 1997 were included as Exhibit A in the
opinion. Id. at 361-62.
95. Id.
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depending on whether a country's government is on friendly or hostile
terms with the United States.
B. Customary International Law
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala was the first time a court held that a plaintiff
could litigate human rights claims in a United States federal court, even
though the alleged acts occurred in another country.96 Prior to Filartiga,
an alien could not bring an action against government officials, even if
those officials had committed atrocious acts of violence. Since
Filartiga, courts have increasingly expanded the use of customary
international law toward upholding human rights."
Scholars have argued that non-state actors, such as Unocal, cannot be
held liable under customary international law. "Customary international
law" (also referred to as "public international law" or "the law of
nations") has been defined as the law regulating relations between states,
or regulating the singular conduct of states in particular areas such as
human rights.98 Taken literally, this definition only refers to states and
not to private actors. In his Tel-Oren concurrence, Judge Edwards held
that customary norms of international law addressed only acts
committed by a "state"." Therefore, in the context of the Unocal case, it
96. 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2nd Cir. 1980). Filartiga involved an action brought by
citizens of Paraguay against a former state official who had caused the wrongful death of
their son by torturing him. At trial, the defendant official successfully argued that the
"law of nations" did not cover a government's acts of torture on its own citizens.
Consequently, the district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit reversed, stating that such acts violate international customary
norms. The court noted that defendants can be sued in U.S. courts when they are served
within the United States. See id. at 877-86. See also Pizzuro & Delaney, supra note 1,
at S5.
97. See generally Walker, supra note 4 (providing a general overview of the use of
international law in United States courts and discussing the Filartiga, Tel-Oren and
Kadic cases in particular). See also Pizzaro & Delaney, supra note 1, at S5 (stating that
the Unocal decision may provide the courts with another opportunity to expand the use
of customary international law beyond Filartiga and Kadic). Since Tel-Oren, courts
have increasingly held that tort violations are actionable under the ATCA. See Walker,
supra note 4, at 548. See also, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a plaintiff mother stated a
valid claim under the ATCA against the daughter of former Philippine President
Ferdinand Marcos and against the head of the Philippine police for the torture and
murder of her son); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
that an Ethiopian military official was liable for acts of torture under the ATCA).
98. James Paul George, Defining Filartiga: Characterizing International Torture
Clains in United States Courts, 3 DICKJ. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1984).
99. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 791, 791-95 (D. C. Cir. 1984)
(noting the limited possibility of jurisdiction over private defendants under section
1350).
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would seem that only the state actor (SLORC),'Oo and not the private
party (Unocal), would be liable under customary international law.
However, under current customary international law, plaintiffs can sue
both government and non-government actors for the commission of
tortious acts. In Kadic v. Karadzic,°1 the court held that the "law of
nations," as understood in the modem era, is not confined in its reach to
state action; in certain circumstances, private individuals as well as
nations can violate international law.'02 The Kadic court noted that
participation in slave trade violates the law of nations "whether
undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as
private individuals."10 3 Furthermore, the Unocal ruling emphasized that
the alleged violations of non-state actors must occur in conjunction with
activities of a state. If this nexus is satisfied, then non-state actors can
violate customary international law.
A more recent opinion, issued in February of 1998,04 reaffirmed the
100. Under the FSIA, United States courts did not have jurisidiction over SLORC.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
101. 70 F.3d 232 (2d. Cir. 1995).
102. Kadic involved actions brought by two groups of Bosnia-Herzegovina victims
against Radovan Karadzic, the self-proclaimed president of an unrecognized Bosnian-
Serb entity. The plaintiffs sued under the ATCA for the planning and ordering of
murder, rape and other forms of torture. Although the district court dismissed the
complaint on the theory that private individuals could not violate the law of nations (only
states and agents of the state could), the Second Circuit reversed, holding that private
parties can also be accountable under the ATCA. See Pizzuro & Delaney, supra note I
at S5. See also David P. Kunstle, Note, Kadic v. Karadzic: Do Private Individuals Have
Enforceable Rights and Obligations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 6 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 319, 326-29 (1996).
103. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,239 (2d. Cir. 1995). Compare Kadic with Tel-
Oren which involved several differing opinions by the judges on the issue of whether
private actors can be liable under international law. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 774. Judge
Edwards held that only state actors could be liable for torture under customary
international law; Judge Bork held that the ACTA only granted jurisdiction and did not
create a cause of action; and Judge Robb argued that the case should be dismissed under
the political question doctrine. See id. at 795-822. However, Tel-Oren did not foreclose
the possibility that private actors could be sued under the ACTA. Judge Edwards stated
that slave trading, piracy and "a handful of other private acts" constitute violations of
international law. Id.
104. Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 993 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1998). The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, Anwar Haddam and FIS, contributed to a
"campaign of violence" throughout Algeria. FIS is an organization which espouses an
extremist interpretation of Islamic law; Haddam is a high ranking official in the FIS.
Allegedly, Haddam "participated and conspired in crimes against humanity, war crimes,
hijacking, summary execution, rape, mutilation, sexual slavery, murder and numerous
other violations of international law." Id. at 5. Plaintiffs claim that the FIS has terrorized
women and political opponents. The court ruled, among other things, that: it had
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Kadic holding that non-state actors can be liable for offenses that violate
international law."5 The court rejected the defendant's argument that,
under customary international law, a non-state actor must act under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of a foreign state to be sued
under the ATCA.' 6 Applying Kadic, the court found that the ATCA
does not require the private defendant to have acted under the auspices
of the state.07 Therefore, plaintiffs can sue non-state actors under the
ATCA 08
Applying modem customary international law to the Unocal case,
Unocal (even as a non-state actor) can be held liable for abuses
committed in violation of the ATCA.' 9 However, even though Unocal
can be sued under the statute, plaintiffs will have to show a nexus
between Unocal's participation in the project and the tortious acts
committed by SLORC. The Unocal case may turn on whether Unocal is
truly a partner of SLORC, and whether the tortious acts were in fact
committed in furtherance of the business venture. ° In order to escape
liability, Unocal may argue: (1) that it was not a joint venturer and (2)
that the abuses were not in furtherance of building the pipeline.
First, Unocal might argue that it was not a joint venturer with SLORC.
Indeed, the contracts executed for construction of the pipeline may not
indicate joint venture status. The negotiations between the parties led to
what has been described as a "production-sharing contract for a joint
venture gas drilling project" along with "construction of [a] gas pipeline
personal jurisdiction over Haddam, even as a private actor; it had subject matter
jurisdiction under the ATCA; and the plaintiffs' claims were justiciable. See id.
105. The FIS court declined to follow Tel-Oren because Kadic was more on point
and more timely. See id. at 8. Both Kadic and FIS dealt with war crimes, but Unocal
dealt with crimes against humanity. For this reason, the Unocal court may choose to
distinguish Kadic, and hold that Unocal as a private actor cannot be liable unless Unocal
had acted under the "color of law." However, the plaintiffs in Unocal can argue that the
Kadic holding is not limited to piracy, slave trade, war crimes and aircraft hijacking.
The court was clear that these examples were not exclusive and that private actors can be
liable for "offenses of 'universal concern'." Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
106. See FIS, 993 F. Supp. at 7-8.
107. See id. at 8. The court supported this contention with language from Kadic,
which interpreted Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to apply to all parties to
a conflict, not just government officials. Common Article 3 also provides that civilians
be treated humanely and it prohibits "cruel treatment and torture." Id.
108. See id.
109. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
110. In a November 5, 1997 ruling, the NCGUB asserted that Unocal is liable for
SLORC's alleged violations because Unocal is a joint venturer or implied partner in the
pipeline project. National Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) v. Unocal
Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 334 (C. D. Cal. 1997). Although the NCGUB case has not been
consolidated with the Unocal case, Judge Paez is hearing both cases. Judge Paez noted
that because the cases involve similar allegations, certain issues will be decided
consistently. Id. at 334-35. Therefore, analyzing Judge Paez' determinations in NCGUB
(on whether Unocal is deemed a joint venturer) may help predict his rulings in Unocal.
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in Burmese territory."'' n  Depending on the language of the agreement,
Unocal may not be considered a "joint venturer." Therefore, Unocal
may not be held liable for the abuses committed by SLORC.
Second, in proving that the abuses were not in furtherance of the
project, Unocal can argue that the 250-mile pipeline inevitably would
touch some portion of the country where abuses occur, simply because
the entire country is in military upheaval. Because the pipeline is so
long, it would probably intersect some military action occurring at some
location. Unocal's strongest argument is that the pipeline's coexistence
with military activity alone does not establish that the abuses occurred in
furtherance of the pipeline project. The abuses may have occurred
whether or not the pipeline was being built.
On the other hand, facts brought out in discovery may reveal that
Unocal intended for SLORC to forcibly remove Burmese farmers from
their land in order to build the pipeline. As part of the agreement,
SLORC was to clear forests and provide labor for the building of the
pipeline."' If SLORC also agreed to forcibly remove the farmers to
assist Unocal in building the pipeline, the plaintiffs may successfully
argue that the abuses were committed in furtherance of the project.1
3
In the future, courts may be increasingly more willing to hold TNCs
accountable under the ATCA for acts that violate customary
international law, even if those acts were committed solely by foreign
partners. Although TNCs can be sued under the statute, plaintiffs carry
the burden of proving that a partnership existed and that the abuses
occurred in furtherance of the project. Depending on the facts of the
case, this burden may be strong or slight. In general, the burden seems
reasonable, since the more closely TNCs are involved in the abuses, the
more accountable TNCs should be.
Knowing that cases may hinge on basic partnership law, future TNCs
may simply set up contracts that do not establish true partnerships. With
111. Pizzuro & Delaney, supra note 1, at S5.
112. See id. The NCGUB plaintiffs asserted that "Unocal was put on notice that
SLORC would use forced labor and commit other serious human rights abuses in
connection with the Project." NCGUB, 176 F.R.D. at 336. Plaintiffs alleged that the
President of Unocal, John Imle stated: "What I'm saying is that if you threaten the
pipeline, there's gonna be more military. If forced labor goes hand in glove with the
military, yes there will be more forced labor. For every threat to the pipeline, there will
be a reaction." Id. This statement seems to mirror the attitude taken by Royal Dutch
Shell in Nigeria when it refused to cease its drilling operations in spite of protests against
it. See infra Part II.C.4.
113. See Pizzuro & Delaney, supra note 1, at S5.
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a carefully crafted contract, parties can escape liability by arguing that a
true partnership did not exist between the TNC and the tortfeasor. For
example, a TNC can contract with a foreign government and stipulate in
the contract that the TNC will only provide the technology for the
particular operation. The local government will perform every other
aspect of the operation, such as building and implementing the
technology. If sued, the TNC can argue that it had no connection with
the project other than providing technology, and merely providing
technology does not contribute to human rights abuses. By distancing
itself from the abuses, TNCs can escape liability in this manner.
Applying this theory to the Unocal case, if Unocal contracted to
perform only a limited number of tasks with respect to building the
pipeline, it would have a stronger argument that its activities did not
further human rights violations. Moreover, if SLORC was named an
"independent contractor" in the contract, Unocal would probably not be
liable for the torts committed by SLORC. SLORC alone would be
liable, because it would have been responsible for all tasks related to the
actual construction of the pipeline. However, as previously mentioned,
government defendants are often entitled to sovereign immunity
protection. '  Therefore, neither a government nor a TNC would be
liable in this situation, and the ability of plaintiffs to successfully sue
these defendants would be severely limited.
On the other hand, even if Unocal was given only a limited role in the
project under the terms of the contract, it may still be liable if, in reality,
it played a significant role in actually constructing the pipeline. Courts
will treat TNCs as partners if they in fact acted like partners, regardless
of their named status in the contract. Therefore, the extent of
participation of TNCs should determine the extent of their liability."'
C. Moral Duty
1. Moral Duty in General
Several commentators have argued that TNCs have a moral duty to
withhold investment from or to divest from ventures with corrupt
governments."6  One commentator states that because government
114. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
115. However, the fact that courts treat TNCs that act like partners as partners, will
not necessarily deter TNC behavior in this regard. Often, TNCs can hide the level of
their own participation in their projects. Plaintiffs will have difficulty in showing the
nature and extent of TNC participation in particular projects.
116. See THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHicS OF INTERNATIONAL BusiuqsS 81-85
(1989) (stating that although withholding investment can be harmful economically,
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regulatory efforts are essentially ineffective, "[i]t is time to examine the
roles of other relevant actors, including business, labor, the media, and
the general public, in promoting and protecting human rights"" '7 She
further maintains that TNCs in particular have not only legal, but ethical
responsibilities to uphold human rights."1 8
Another commentator explains that the expansion of international
customary law constituted a first revolution in protecting human rights,
and that the second revolution consists of the moral responsibilities of
TNCs to uphold human rights." 9  He emphasizes that corporations
should have a conscience. Indeed, he is not alone in his thinking, as
even corporate executives acknowledge the need for a "conscience"
when investing abroad.'2'
2. Promoting Democracy Abroad
In response to the argument for imposing moral duties on TNCs,
others argue that continuous overseas investment may actually promote
democracy in countries ruled by corrupt governments. Unocal itself
argued that democracy is promoted by investing in Burma.'" The
greater presence TNCs have overseas, the more likely it is that TNCs
will positively influence governments toward democratic reform.'23 The
TNCs should factor in moral consequences of their actions when deciding to invest
abroad); Cassel, supra note 52, at 1978-79.
117. Frey, supra note 12, at 153.
118. See id.
119. See Cassel, supra note 52, at 1963.
120. See id.
121. In 1995, John Duerden, former President of Reebok, said:
As a public company, we have an ethical responsibility to build value for
Reebok's shareholders-but not at all possible costs. What we seek is
harmony between the profit-maximizing demands of our free market system
and the legitimate needs of our shareholders, and the needs and aspirations of
the larger world community in which we are all citizens.
John Duerden, 'Walking the Walk' on Global Ethics, DIEcTORS & BOARDS
(INvESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST INC.), Mar. 22, 1995, available at 1995 WL 12220270.
See also Cassel, supra note 52, at 1979; Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note
25.
122. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 895 n.17 (C.D. Cal. 1997). Unocal
claims to be promoting democracy through an elaborate development program in Burma
that includes building schools and improving medical care. See Danitz, supra note 2, at
3. Unocal proposes that the best way to lessen human rights abuses in Burma is to
increase investment there. See id.
123. Unocal claims that its pipeline project will help locals by improving the
standard of living in the vicinity. See G. Pascal Zachary, U.S. Companies Back Out of
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U.S. government seems to subscribe to this view because it has
continued to allow companies to "assert positive pressure on SLORC
through their investments in Burma.'"' 4
In August of 1998, Atlantic Richfield Co. ("Arco") chose to withdraw
its operations from Burma due to "changing investment priorities," and
supposedly not because of public pressure to withdraw from that
country."z Arco spokesman Al Greenstein stated that Arco still believes
that "engagement is preferable to isolation and companies like Arco are
a constructive force in poor countries like Myanmar." '26 Arco, and other
companies conducting operations overseas, often argue that they are
promoting democracy by exposing other countries to democratic ideals.
However, Arco may in fact have been influenced by public pressure.'
Arco was one of the last remaining U.S. TNCs to withdraw from Burma;
Unocal is currently the only major U.S. firm still conducting business in
Burma."
In the context of China, business leaders have asserted that democratic
values are promoted as the U.S. and China form more and more business
contacts.' They assert that these contacts may influence the Chinese
government's thinking toward upholding human rights. 3 ' Furthermore,
overseas investors argue that investment in developing countries
promotes economic growth, which thereby develops a stronger middle
class. As this middle class becomes stronger, it is likely to assert
demands for fundamental liberties and respect for human rights.' 31 In
this manner, human rights will be promoted through overseas
investment.
However, overseas investment by U.S. companies may or may not
promote democratic reform depending on the particular circumstances of
the investment and the countries involved. For example, as to China in
particular, one author argues that the best way to promote human rights
is by persuading the Chinese government to reform its practices, rather
than by regulating private investment. 32 Another states that greater
involvement by the U.S. business community in promoting human rights
Bunna, Citing Human Rights Concerns, Graft, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1995, at AlO.
124. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 895 n.17.
125. Evelyn Iritani, Arco to End Exploration in Myanmar, L.A. TvIES, Aug. 12,
1998, at Dl. Arco spokesman Al Greenstein stated that the company's decision not to
renew one of its oil exploration leases in Burma was not influenced by "protests or
events inside Myanmar." Id. at Dl.
126. Id. at D9.
127. See id.
128. See id. at D1, D9.
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in China is not an adequate substitute for well planned government
actions. 33 Government persuasion would be more effective because of
the relationship the U.S. has with China with respect to trade and
investment.1M
In the particular situation of Burma, the efforts of the U.S. government
discussed in Part II show that government efforts have failed, and that
direct government persuasion is unlikely to induce any positive
changes.' 35 Perhaps reform is best done through the private sector.
Investment by corporations such as Unocal may encourage democratic
reform, especially because large U.S. corporations can exert enormous
influence over countries as small as Burma. On the other hand, no
reform will occur if TNCs merely promote abuses by protecting their
investments at any cost to human rights.
3. Moral Duty Established Through Codes of Conduct
Even assuming continued investment abroad promotes democracy,
corporations may still have a moral duty to promote human rights. This
duty can be imposed through codes of conduct. Because TNCs are
gaining more power than governments themselves, TNCs should
develop and follow codes of conduct to combat human rights abuses that
occur in connection with their projects. 36 Several companies have found
a balance between maximizing profits and protecting human rights
abroad by adhering to codes of conduct that respect the rights of locals
while still making profits.
For example, in 1995, the Gap adopted human rights standards for all
of its overseas contractors.' In response to sweatshop conditions
occurring in El Salvador, the Gap terminated its contracts and refused to
do business with contractors until labor conditions were investigated and
improved.' Such actions taken on the part of TNCs may lead to reform.
Other TNCs have taken similar steps toward protecting human rights
in China. In 1992, Sears, Roebuck and Co. adopted a policy against
133. See id. at 100.
134. See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 54, at 101.
135. See supra Part 11.
136. See Cassel, supra note 52, at 1964. See also Steven R. Salbu, True Codes
Versus Voluntary Codes of Ethics in International Markets: Towards the Preservation of
Colloquy in Emerging Global Communities, 15 U. PA. INT'L Bus. L. 327, 330 (1994).
137. See Cassel, supra note 52, at 1968.
138. See id.
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imports made by prison labor. The policy included a provision that
Sears employees could make unannounced inspections of manufacturing
firms in China to ensure compliance with U.S. law.'39 In the same year,
Levi Strauss and Co. developed a policy in which it would factor in
human rights considerations when selecting its business partners in
China. Similarly, Reebok International Ltd. adopted a human rights
policy, first toward its operations in China, and then toward all of its
overseas operations. The policy includes an explicit statement that
Reebok deplores the use of force against human rights.' These private
efforts show progress toward ensuring human rights abroad."'
4. Poor Display of Corporate Responsibility: Royal
Dutch Shell in Nigeria
In contrast, the case of Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria involved a poor
display of corporate responsibility with respect to human rights. Similar
to Unocal's agreement with SLORC, Royal Dutch Shell entered into a
joint venture with Nigeria's state oil company."' The state oil company
supplied significant revenue to the corrupt military regime of General
Sani Abacha.'" Shell's continuous drilling and construction of pipelines
139. See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 54, at 107.
140. See id. One of the first applications of Levis Stauss' elaborate code of conduct
was in 1992, in response to working conditions in Saipan. A factory owner had
allegedly imposed slave conditions on his workers. After inspecting the Saipan factories,
Levis Strauss found the conditions to be unsatisfactory and subsequently terminated its
contract. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 25, at 675-79. Levis
Strauss' labor rights code, entitled "Business Partner Terms of Engagement and
Guidelines for Country Selection," proposes conduct for upholding health and safety
conditions and human rights. In the code, Levis Strauss established the authority to
terminate contracts with suppliers, using an elaborate internal monitoring and
enforcement system. See id. The company has utilized this monitoring system by
performing surprise inspections in factories in several countries, including China. In
response to its findings, Levis Strauss decided to withdraw its entire operations from
China. See id.
141. See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 54, at 108.
142. See Zachary, supra note 123, at A10. These private efforts are similar to those
taken by corporate executives in their dealings with South Africa, and the anti-apartheid
efforts by private groups seemed to have significant impacts on total reform in that
country. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
143. See Cassel, supra note 52, at 1965. In 1993, the Nigerian military, headed by
General Sani Abacha, seized control of the Nigerian government. See John Cook,
Welcome to the New and Improved Nigeria, MOTHER JONES, Jan/Feb. 1998, at 51, 51.
Abacha has allegedly provided military support for Royal Dutch Shell's environmentally
destructive operations in Nigeria. See id. International groups and governments have
been threatening to impose sanctions on Nigeria, which would eliminate the $12 billion
in profits Nigeria receives from oil each year. See id.
144. See Cook, supra note 143, at 51; NIGERIA Joint Venture-The Shell-Led
Group, APS REvimw OIL MARKET TRENDS, Sept. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL
8088454. In 1997, Shell's joint venture with the Nigerian government accounted for
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polluted the water and destroyed the lands of the Ogoni people living in
the Niger River Delta. '45
Because Shell's operations caused such severe effects, including
destroying the livelihood of the Ogoni people, a group of activists
sabotaged Shell's equipment.' Shell allegedly retaliated by calling
upon the Nigerian military to attack the Ogoni, leading to several
murders and massacres.'4" Shell also helped transport troops through the
use of its helicopters and boats to enable the military to attack the Ogoni
villages.14
The case came to trial, and the verdict resulted in the sentencing to
death of the leader of the Ogoni activist group.'49 Consequently, protests
poured in from the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Amnesty
International, the U.S. and British governments, South Africa's Nelson
Mandela, and several others.5 ' Allegations of bribery of the witnesses
by the Nigerian government (with Shell's acquiescence) caused
particular controversy with respect to the unfairness of the trial.'
The case of Royal Dutch Shell is an extreme example, but it
almost half of Nigeria's oil production. See id.
145. See Cassel, supra note 52, at 1964-65; see also Dirk Beveridge, Shell,
Opponents Posture on Eve of Annual Meeting, AssoCIATED PRESs, May 13, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 4865992 (stating that Shell's profits generated from the "high
price of human life and dignity"); Aaron Sachs, A Planet Unfree: What Does Human
Rights Have to Do with Environmental Protection? Everything, SIERRA, Nov. 21, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 9871404 (criticizing General Abacha for sacrificing the health and
welfare of entire villages in order to accomodate multinational corporations). Shell
caused additional harm in the Ogoni region, including polluting the drinking water, and
driving away fish from local water sources. See Danielle Knight, Environment-Rights:
Struggle Continues in Nigeria, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 19, 1997, available at 1997
WL 13256684. According to the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, the Niger delta is the most endangered river delta in the world due to
excessive oil extraction in that area. See id.
146. See Cassel, supra note 52, at 1964-65.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 1966.
149. See id.
150. See id. An activist group, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
(MOSOP), filed a lawsuit in U.S. federal court in New York against Shell. The hanging
of the leader activist group, Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight other activists was the impetus
for the lawsuit. See id; see generally Worldwide Protests Against Shell, Africa Policy
Information Center, AFRICA NEws SERV., May 15, 1997, available at 1997 WL
11108399 [hereinafter Worldwide Protests]. For a comprehensive discussion of Shell's
operations in Nigeria, see (visited Mar. 30, 1999) <http://ww.shellnigeria.com/
issues/ogoni/html>.
151. Cassel, supra note 52, at 1965. See Nigeria: Review 1997, AFRICA REVrEV OF
WORLD INFORMATION, Feb 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10204078.
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demonstrates that TNCs have not been held responsible in the past for
human rights abuses that occur in connection with their overseas
projects.'52 Unlike Royal Dutch Shell, other companies have in fact
pulled their entire operations out of countries in which grave human
rights abuses occur."3 These companies seem to be setting better
examples for how such human rights situations should be addressed."
Unfortunately, companies that tend to divest are mostly retail clothing
and goods manufacturers that usually have smaller amounts of money
invested overseas than the amounts invested by large oil companies like
Unocal and Royal Dutch Shell. Retail manufacturers are not as
economically committed to overseas operations because they often
invest only small amounts of money compared to the billions of dollars
needed to start and maintain oil drilling operations. Oil companies are
also more limited geographically, depending on whether oil is available
in a certain region. In this respect, oil companies have much more at
stake, and therefore less incentive to divest.
Furthermore, even though retail manufacturers are persuaded by
public opinion, oil companies are only effectively persuaded by financial
concerns. 5 Unlike clothing or goods which consumers can easily
replace with a new brand (a brand of a company not involved in human
rights violations), oil and gas are not as replaceable. Therefore retail
clothing and goods manufacturers will alter their conduct in response to
152. In 1996, a group of plaintiffs filed a suit in a United States district court against
Shell for the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96
Civ. 8386 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1996). In 1997, Shell stated it would try to promote human
rights in countries where it operates. The chair of Shell Transport and Trading, Mark
Moody-Stewart, stated there is no "fundamental conflict between financial
performance[] and 'soft issues.' Many shareholders want outstanding financial returns in
a way they can feel proud .... ." Robert Corzine, Companies and Finance: Shell Explains
Policy Changes to Investors, FNANCLL TIM s, Jan. 19, 1998, available at 1998 WL
3526039.
153. Levi Strauss and Timberland pulled out of China; Levi Strauss, Liz Claiborne,
Eddie Bauer, and Federated Department Stores pulled out of Burma. See Cassel, supra
note 52, at 1973. Pepsico Inc. has also divested holdings in Burma. See Danitz, supra
note 2, at 3.
154. Apparently, the NCGUB has been attempting to persuade Unocal to divest
since 1993. See Danitz, supra note 2, at 3. Sein Win, the exiled Burmese Prime
Minister and Director of the NCGUB, said, "We explained the situation to Unocal
officials-that the situation is not good and we need them to stop." Id.
155. However, one oil company was probably affected by public opinion.
According to Simon Billenness, a leading Myamnar critic, Atlantic Richfield Co.
("Arco"), which withdrew its operations from Myanmar in August of 1998, was "the
only U.S. oil company still doing business in Myanmar that was vulnerable to a
consumer boycott, because, unlike Unocal, it sells oil and gas products directly to the
public." Iritani, supra note 125, at D9. Even though Arco was subject to consumer
boycott, Arco claimed that its withdrawal from Myanmar was not due to "international
pressure to punish the increasingly belligerent military regime." Id. at Dl.
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public opinion because public opinion directly affects their sales. 6 In
contrast, oil companies will not change their conduct because public
opinion does not necessarily affect them financially.'57
For these reasons, corporations conducting business in sectors of the
economy other than retail perhaps should not be held to the higher
standards that retail manufacturers have set. The only effective way to
ensure that TNCs uphold human rights may be to establish economic
incentives for such conduct. However, it is unclear what types of
economic incentives should be implemented. For example, one method
of providing economic incentives might be to hold directors personally
liable for corporate acts that promote human rights abuses. The threat of
personal liability may induce directors to refrain from corrupt behavior
and try to actively prevent their employees from committing abusive
acts.
However, this approach seems drastic. Even if personal liability were
imposed, holding directors personally accountable may lack any
deterrent effects. Corporations will often indemnify directors when
directors are sued personally, as long as the directors were acting in their
corporate capacities. Furthermore, from a policy standpoint, holding a
particular director liable seems unjust because often a single director
cannot control the decisions of an entire corporation. Holding directors
personally liable is just one example demonstrating the complexity of
attempting to create economic incentives for TNCs to uphold human
rights.
156. Companies that tend to establish stringent codes of conduct are those whose
business success is affected by brand name and corporate image. These companies do
not want their names associated with child labor and abusive working conditions, mainly
because of potential profit losses due to decreased sales and boycotts. See Remarks of
Lance Compa, Transcript of Jan. 7, 1995 Meeting of the Section on International Law of
the American Association of Schools, 17 COmp. LAB. L.J. 338 (1996).
157. Unocal and Royal Dutch Shell had few economic incentives to pull out of
Burma and Nigeria, because public opposition to human rights abuses would probably
not affect their sales. Interestingly, the brother of Ken Saro-Wiwa, Dr. Owens Wiwa,
has traveled to several countries to educate the public on the struggle the Ogoni people
have faced due to Shell's operations. See Worldwide Protests, supra note 150. He stated
that boycotting Shell's products would be one method of changing Shell's behavior. He
also advised cities and local governments to adopt selective purchasing laws, like those
adopted against Burma. Another recommendation was to pressure Congress to impose
sanctions against Nigeria. Id. The Sierra Club environmental group has advocated
placing an oil embargo on Nigeria to reform the practices of General Abacha's regime.
Danielle Knight, Rights-Nigeria: New Accusations of Arrest and Torture, INTER PRESS
SERV., Jan. 15, 1998, available at 1998 WL 5985345.
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5. Conflict Between Economic and Social Goals
As indicated, the main problem in regulating TNCs overseas is the
absence of existing economic incentives to uphold human rights. In fact,
the sole reason some corporations invest overseas is to take advantage of
foreign laws and foreign working conditions. Substantial profits can be
made from under-the-counter-deals and cheap labor, giving corporations
strong economic incentives to invest despite human rights abuses.
Therefore, corporate profit incentives seem to be in direct conflict with
social responsibility abroad.58
Furthermore, once a corporation has invested overseas, it is often
difficult to prove that the corporation, through its directors, possessed
the requisite knowledge that the human rights abuses occurred in
connection with its project. Consequently, corporations have even fewer
incentives to act responsibly because they are unlikely to suffer any
negative consequences. And even if they are "caught" and sued, often
they are better off financially to risk being sued and to simply settle or
pay the judgment costs.'59 In the absence of strong incentives to uphold
human rights abroad, perhaps the best way to regulate corporate activity
is from within the corporation, through private codes of conduct.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT
A. Codes of Conduct Generally
Codes of conduct can be an excellent tool for mitigating human rights
158. See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 54, at 97; Cassel, supra note 52, at 1977.
Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago published an article that described
corporate social responsibility as a "fundamentally subversive doctrine" in a free society.
He states that when executives commit corporate funds for social responsibility, they
wrongfully usurp the funds of their shareholders, or possibly their customers, or even of
their employees. Doing public good is the responsibility of the government. See Milton
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Profits, N.Y. TiMaS
MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. See generally Robert Corzine and Antony Goldman,
Talks Sought Over Nigeria Sackings, FINANCAL TIMES, June 6, 1997, available at 1997
WL 11033101 (addressing shareholder concerns over the Royal Dutch Shell operations
in Nigeria).
159. TNCs may simply continue to invest in corrupt governments and plan on
settling if sued. TNCs may even allocate money for this purpose if they foresee the
likelihood of litigation. Unocal may have large incentives to settle, especially because of
the nature of the relief that the plaintiffs are seeking. The plaintiffs have requested not
only damages, but injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent Unocal from continuing its
massive pipeline project. This threat of an injunction that would lose Unocal millions of
dollars, may prompt Unocal to offer a large settlement. See Pizzuro & Delaney, supra
note 1, at S5.
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violations that occur in connection with TNC activities overseas. ' TNC
codes of conduct have been defined as "devices for the protection of the
economies of host countries (and of host country workers, customers,
competitors, and creditors) from unilateral action by multinational
enterprises headquarters."' 6 ' An increasing number of TNCs are
adopting codes of conduct, and existing codes have become increasingly
more stringent. '62 Although codes of conduct can be arbitrary, every
corporation should at least have minimum standards. 63 Most corporate
representatives conducting business overseas would readily admit that
human rights abuses are of at least minimal concern to their
businesses.' 6
Privately created codes have several benefits, including their ability to
be tailored to specific projects and their ability to state explicitly when
TNCs' activities cross the line from legal to illegal.' Through codes of
conduct, TNCs can know whether their activities are violating statutes,
treaties or international law.
A particular code of conduct might include provisions that follow
160. See Geltman & Skroback, supra note 60, at 465 (stating that the Sullivan
Principles of South Africa demonstrate that voluntary codes of conduct that demand
responsibility beyond what it legally required of them can be successful. See Valerie A.
Zondorak, A New Face in Corporate Environmental Responsibility: The Valdez
Principles, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 457, 457-58 (1991) (discussing whether
voluntary codes of conduct are effective); see also Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere,
supra note 25, at 663.
161. H. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational
Enterprises, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 3, 13 (N. Horn ed. 1980).
162. Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 54, at 96; see Compa & Hinchliffe-
Darricarrere, supra note 25, at 675-79 (describing in detail the standards set forth by
Levis Strauss and Reebok and how those companies make divestment choices). Royal
Dutch Shell has supposedly drafted a set of codes for conducting its business practices
and has established a "social accountability unit" to examine human rights and
environmental concerns. Asamoah, supra note 29, at 566. Similarly, British Petroleum,
having been accused of human rights violations in the Casanare region of Columbia, has
drafted codes of conduct in response to strong public pressure against its abusive
practices. See id.; William Raynor and Richard Halstead, Columbia's "Dirty War"
Embroils BP, THE INDEPENDENT, June 22, 1997, at 2.
163. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarreere, supra note 25, at 675-79; Frey, supra
note 12, at 164.
164. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 25, at 689 (stating that
"forward-looking" corporate leaders will recognize the value of establishing codes that
protect human rights). Upholding human rights will not only avoid offending customers,
but it may improve overall empoyee productivity. See id.
165. See Frey, supra note 12, at 154.
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customary international law.' 6 Admittedly, customary international law
is often ambiguous, but the codes can at least reflect general and well-
accepted principles of customary international law, such as refraining
from torture, bribery and murder. Although such a code would merely
provide minimum standards, TNCs can incorporate additional rules
depending on the particulars of their businesses.
For example, Unocal could have adopted a code forbidding all
business activity in Burma that promoted abusive acts by SLORC.
Certainly, this type of code might not be well-received, because of
Unocal's economic interests, and the possibility that Unocal had already
entered into certain agreements with SLORC. Even if Unocal had
chosen to adopt such a code, it may not be worth forfeiting large
investments in Burma in order to adhere to a code that is voluntary and
not legally enforceable. 67
Perhaps a distinction should be made between TNCs that actively
contribute to human rights abuses (as in the Royal Dutch Shell case) and
those that only passively know of the existence of the abuses (which
may be the case for Unocal).' The sentiment is that less punishment
should be given to TNCs that are further removed from the abuses.
On the other hand, TNCs may have incentives to hide their active
roles by delegating duties to other actors, such as foreign government
officials, who are less likely to be held liable in United States courts. In
such a situation, TNCs will escape accountability even though they
planned and furthered the tortious acts. As this discussion indicates, the
real problem is the absence of incentives for TNCs to adhere to their
codes of conduct. Because the codes are privately created, no outside
166. See supra Part III(B) (for a discussion of modem customary international law).
See also Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 25, at 687 (stating that codes can
be easily drafted by following the several models presented by the United Nations, the
Internal Labor Organization, governments and private companies). Some of the features
a code should include are: assigning responsibility to an on-site manager; ongoing
auditing and reporting of labor conditions; supervisory visits to production facililties;
and public reporting of labor conditions. See id. at 688.
167. Whether adhering to a code of conduct is "worth" forfeiting large investments
is a matter of perspective. From a shareholder perspective, shareholders have the right to
sell their shares if they are adamantly opposed to Unocal's maintaining its operations in
Burma. Presumably, those shareholders who do hold onto their Unocal shares are
mainly concerned with maximizing profits. Those shareholders are probably not
inclined to support compliance with voluntary codes of conduct merely for the sake of
promoting socially responsible behavior.
168. See Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (for plaintiffs
allegations against Unocal). See also Platt's Oilgram News, "Unocal: Recent Court
Ruling on Burma Not Significant," Apr. 18, 1997, available at 1997 WL 8878384
(reporting statements made by attorneys involved in the case); Cox, supra note 1
(reporting statements of Unocal's General Counsel Dennis P.R. Codon denying any
forced labor in connection with Unocal's projects in Burma).
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enforcement mechanism exists to ensure compliance, and therefore
TNCs will not follow the codes.
B. The Problem of Enforceability
Indeed, most TNCs, including Unocal, have some existing set of codes
that govern their overseas transactions, but the main problem is
enforceability. The model codes are not binding-they only impose a
moral duty.'69 For example, the OECD "Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises" is voluntary only and not legally enforceable. Similarly,
the United Nations Code does not contain any provision imposing legal
liability.'7 Obviously, privately developed codes of conduct are not
binding because they are created by the corporations themselves, and
there is no outside regulating body to ensure compliance.
One proposal for enforcement by an outside regulating body is for a
national government to regulate TNCs' overseas conduct using the
values and standards of public international law.' Another proposal is
to develop international agencies with binding authority to ensure that
codes of conduct are followed.'72 Monitoring can also be done by the
private sector through professional organizations.'73 Yet another form of
monitoring may simply be through public opposition to human rights
violations.' 74 Furthermore, if TNCs publicly announce their human
rights policies, they will be even more inclined to follow them.
Even though these proposals seem feasible in theory, they may create
several problems of implementation. Although they may create
temporary or even long term incentives, only government legislation is
legally enforceable.
Absent any existing government regulation, the current means of
enforcement is by TNCs themselves.'75 Codes may be highly effective
169. See Claudia M. Pardinas, The Enigma of the Legal Liability of Transnational
Corporations, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 405, 435 (1991); Remarks of Lance
Compa, supra note 156, at 362 (stating that multilateral government-inspired codes are
mostly in the form of guidelines and are not enforceable).
170. Pardinas, supra note 169, at 441.
171. See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 54, at 115.
172. See Pardinas, supra note 169, at 448-49.
173. See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 54, at 119.
174. See Geltman & Skroback, supra note 60, at 473 (stating that media pressure
and strong public interest can influence corporate divestment).
175. See Cassel, supra note 52, at 1964 (arguing that private multinational
corporations are beginning to accept responsibility for human rights in the form of self-
imposed codes of conduct and other private initiatives). Judges and politicians have
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depending on the corporation and whether or not it mandates strict
compliance with its codes. Existing standards reflect that the further
removed TNCs are from human rights abuses, the less responsibility
they impose upon themselves to mitigate abuses."6 Also, certain
corporations will look for ways to circumvent the rules, especially if
large investments are involved. Even if they ignore their codes
completely, they will not be punished. 7 Therefore, absent any effective
regulation through legislation or privately created codes, U.S.-based
TNCs should be held accountable in U.S. courts for human rights
violations committed in connection with their overseas projects.
Although this result may unfairly hold TNCs accountable for acts
committed by other parties, this remedy seems just because TNCs will
only be held liable if their projects are the underlying cause of the
human rights abuses. If the project, such as the construction of a
pipeline, is not directly furthering the abuses, the court will not hold the
TNC accountable. Thus, TNCs will have the opportunity to refute any
allegations that human rights abuses occurred in furtherance of their
projects.
Furthermore, TNCs know the potential harmful consequences when
they invest in risky or unstable governments. From an economic
addressed a related problem, the problem of corruption in the judicial systems of foreign
countries. Most of the corruption stems from attorneys bribing judges. To address the
issue, leaders have stressed the importance of corporate counsel establishing codes of
conduct. The only effective way of ensuring that foreign judges will not be bribed is for
attorneys to decide as a group that none of them will bribe officials. Honorable J.
Clifford Wallace, Address to the Students of University of San Diego (Feb. 18, 1998). If
just one attorney partakes in bribes, codes of conduct will not be effective. See id.
Leaders believe that statutes will not properly address the problem, and are therefore
encouraging corporate counsel to adopt and follow codes of conduct to reduce the
problem of corruption in foreign judicial systems. See id. This policy is pertinent to the
issue of whether corporations should adopt codes of conduct regarding investment
overseas. Just as attorneys engage in corrupt practices by bribing foreign judges, some
overseas investors engage in a similar corruption by providing corrupt governments with
investment capital. The trend toward remedying corruption overseas seems not to be by
statute or some outside enforcement agency, but by the parties themselves (usually
corporations or corporate counsel). However, one major barrier to reform is the
difficulty in arranging for corporate counsel to cooperate on this issue. Cooperation is a
problem particularly if corporations are operating in countries where bribery is so
pervasive that it is an accepted way of business. See id.
176. See Frey, supra note 12, at 154.
177. When U.S.-based companies commit tortious acts domestically, they are held
accountable in U.S. courts. As a policy argument, just because U.S.-based companies
commit tortious acts overseas, does not mean they should escape liability for those acts.
However, domestic companies know the law beforehand, and can adjust their behavior
accordingly, whereas the activities of TNCs overseas are sometimes legal in the territory
in which they are operating, though illegal in the United States. Therefore, holding
TNCs liable under foreign law seems just, but holding them to U.S. legal standards is
more problematic.
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standpoint, TNCs should bear the loss of a risky investment in a corrupt
government, just like any other business risk. Corporations can absorb
the costs of risky investments by factoring in potential lawsuits or
potential losses that may occur as a result of entering into ventures with
corrupt governments. 
7 8
As previously mentioned, simply allowing plaintiffs to sue in U.S.
courts under the ATCA does not mean that judgment will be entered
against the defendants. Defendants are still afforded a fair trial. They
also have the option to settle. Even though settlement is costly,
corporate executives possess the foresight to factor in potential lawsuits
when deciding to invest. They also have the ability to craft their
contracts to attempt to prevent any sort of human rights abuses from
occurring in connection with their projects. They might include
provisions in their contracts that demand termination of projects if
abusive acts are committed by foreign governments.
Therefore, TNCs have several methods of protection to shield
themselves from liability. Hopefully, these options will allow TNCs to
continue active investment overseas and possibly promote democratic
reforms as they conduct their overseas operations. Until the legislature
adopts an affirmative position on corporate responsibility overseas,
holding TNCs liable in U.S. courts may be an effective means of
ensuring human rights protections in countries where U.S.-based TNCs
operate.
C. The Decision to Invest Initially
A related issue is whether TNCs should invest in the first place in
countries that do not respect internationally recognized human rights.
Circumstances exist where foreign investment in itself contributes to
violations. For example, Unocal's joint venture with SLORC served to
bolster a highly repressive regime, and Royal Dutch Shell's project
generated revenues for an oppressive military dictatorship. Do similarly
situated TNCs have a duty to avoid initial investment?
Although the legislature has not specifically addressed the issue, some
TNCs have taken it upon themselves to bar initial investment in certain
countries. Levi Strauss has adopted a policy barring investment in
178. On the other hand, investors and executives should not necessarily have to
make their businesses a tool for political reform.
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China and Burma for human rights reasons.' Liz Claiborne, Eddie
Bauer, and Federated Department Stores have all refused to conduct
operations in Burma for the same reasons."'
As previously mentioned, local governments have passed laws barring
investment in Burma, and President Clinton is currently barring "new"
investment in Burma. 8' However, it is unclear whether barring such
investment actually reforms oppressive governments. Some argue that
the measures taken by the United States government against Cuba in
recent years, for example, has done little to democratize that country.
Therefore, barring initial investment may be futile.
Nonetheless, TNCs have the power to promote human rights abroad
by using potential investment as a bargaining tool. Because local
governments (such as SLORC and General Abacha's regime) reap great
financial benefits from joint ventures with private entities, TNCs can use
this leverage to demand human rights protections. However, if U.S.
companies do decide to completely withhold investment in an effort to
uphold human rights, foreign governments can simply obtain
investments from other countries and from non-U.S.-based corporations.
In this situation, hulaan rights would not be upheld, and U.S.-based
TNCs would forfeit valuable investment opportunities.
Regardless, U.S.-based TNCs can at least attempt to set a gradual
trend of adhering to customary international law. If corporations
generate greater public awareness on this issue, perhaps reforms toward
upholding human rights will occur.'82 As seen in the case of South
African apartheid, public awareness has been an excellent method in
generating support for upholding human rights abroad.'83
D. The U.S. Court System as an Appropriate Remedy
Although corporate compliance with codes of conduct is a lofty goal,
179. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 25, at 675-79.
180. See Cassel, supra note 52, at 1973. As discussed previously, TNCs
specializing in retail clothing and goods operations usually have greater economic
incentives to uphold human rights.
181. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
182. Even though public opinion may only affect certain types of companies (such
as retail clothing and goods manufacturers), public opinion may serve to motivate all
types of companies to establish codes of conduct because of a sense of moral obligation.
Eventually, it may become standard practice for TNCs to place a high importance on
upholding human rights.
183. The South African apartheid situation is a pertinent example of how public
opinion was persuasive in upholding human rights. Many of the same activists and
legislators who advocated sanctions against South Africa have been rallying to
overthrow SLORC. See Danitz, supra note 2, at 3. However, unlike the strong public
opposition against South African apartheid, only a small amount of public opposition has
been generated against SLORC's military dictatorship. See id.
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codes of conduct are worthless without enforceability. Without
enforceability, and until the legislature passes laws addressing TNC
liability, the only effective means of holding TNCs accountable is
through section 1350 of the ATCA. This recourse may pose several
problems, because plaintiffs still have several hurdles to overcome in
proving the liability of a particular defendant.'4
First, courts may have difficulty obtaining jurisdiction over
government defendants because of sovereign immunity protection, as
demonstrated by the lack of jurisdiction over SLORC in the Unocal
case.'85 Also, governments can shield themselves under the act of state
doctrine which carries the notion that "[e]very sovereign is bound to
respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts
of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another, done within its own territory.' 86
Plaintiffs face other barriers when defendants raise motions to dismiss
on improper venue and forum-non-conveniens grounds.'l Even if
plaintiffs pass these initial hurdles, the suit may still be dismissed if it
raises legitimate foreign policy concerns.'
184. See Walker, supra note 4, at 560 (stating that "[w]hile victims of terrible
human rights violations may seek redress in federal courts against the individual who
caused them such harm, they will face numerous hurdles").
185. In the April 24, 1997 clarifying order in Unocal, Judge Paez held that SLORC
could claim sovereign immunity protection, and therefore the court did not have
jurisdiction over SLORC. Plaintiffs tried to argue that the abuses committed by SLORC
fell within the commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
The exception applies when
[1] the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by a foreign state; or [2] upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or [3]
upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States"
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994). The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that this case falls
within clauses two and three of this exception. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880,
885-88 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
186. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 892, A.12 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252
(1897))). The court rejected Unocal's argument that by adjudicating plaintiffs' claims,
the court is interfering with the foreign policy efforts of Congress and the President
under the act of state doctrine. Id. at 891-95.
187. See Walker, supra note 4, at 560.
188. See id. In several section 1350 cases, the executive branch has expressed its
views to the courts on whether the suit raises foreign policy concerns, and in most cases,
the executive branch has not limited plaintiffs' ability to sue. See id. This fact along
with the fact that Congress can amend or repeal section 1350 as it chooses, but has not
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Because plaintiffs will rarely be able to sue foreign governments,
plaintiffs are left suing only private parties, such as TNCs. However,
plaintiffs' chances for relief have been improved because of the
expansion of customary international law to include non-state actors.""
While U.S. courts may assert jurisdiction over TNCs in this regard,
plaintiffs must still show the existence of the requisite legal relationship
between the TNC and the tortfeasor, and that the torts were committed in
furtherance of that TNC's particular project. Therefore, in answering
the question of whether Unocal should be liable for torts committed by
SLORC, the answer hinges on the specific facts introduced in the case.
Because of the need for a fact intensive inquiry in each case, the U.S.
court system is an appropriate place to determine liability.
A potential long-term effect of holding TNCs liable for acts
committed by foreign partners is that other TNCs may be reluctant to
invest in developing countries or countries ruled by military regimes.
This outcome may stifle open trade and adversely affect relationships
between sovereigns. However, TNCs can thoroughly research all
potential risks before investing in overseas operations. Thus, the
profitability of TNC activities may not be hindered because TNCs can
account for the risks. Ideally, TNCs will strike a balance between
generating profits and upholding human rights abroad.
V. CONCLUSION
Because, as in most cases, the Unocal case will depend on the facts
brought out in litigation, it is unclear whether Unocal will be
accountable for the abuses committed by SLORC. If the case continues
without settling, Unocal's strongest argument may be that SLORC's
abusive activities were not committed in connection with the Yadana
pipeline project. Therefore, even though this case seems to involve
complex and groundbreaking issues of international law, the entire case
may turn on traditional notions of partnership law.
Even though the outcomes of cases involving potential corporate
liability for human rights abuses may seem unpredictable, this
unpredictability will be reduced if the legislature chooses to address the
issue. Absent any legislative directive, corporate codes of conduct may
be an effective method for mitigating human rights abuses abroad.
Although there has been a strong trend towards developing codes of
conduct, the fact that codes are non-binding does little to cure the
done so, lends support to the idea that the U.S. government probably endorses the view
that victims of human rights abuses overseas are entitled to a remedy in U.S. courts. See
id.
189. See supra Part Ill.B.
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problem of human rights abuses. Therefore, when codes of conduct fail,
holding U.S.-based corporations liable in U.S. courts is an appropriate
remedy.
DANIELLE EVERETr
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